

DIPAC

Government Declaration Data

TECHNICAL REPORT 2.0

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About the DIPAC-project

The data described in this report were collected for the DIPAC-project.¹ The project's aim was to investigate the proposed crisis of parties and party systems in Western Europe during the last four decades. The implications of the crisis are that the link between political parties and citizens has been broken, that the political substance of the dominant parties is becoming increasingly similar, and that party systems are being fragmented along new cleavages where right-wing populist, anti-immigration parties are being set against their opposites, such as green parties. The project aimed to answer the following two questions:

1. To what extent are the ideas and policies of political parties converging or diverging in Western European party systems?
2. Are changes in the parties' ideas and policies initiated mainly by the parties, or are they adjusting to voter demand arising from social changes?

One of our main goals was to collect and analyze data on parties, governments, parliaments, and voters in established democracies in a systematic and comparable manner for the time-period from the mid-1970s to the mid-2010s. The eight cases in focus in the project are Denmark, France, Germany², Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The selection of party systems means that the study focuses on established, historically persistent, economically well-developed, and wealthy representative democracies. However, the cases also include varying electoral and party systems in both federal and unitary states, as well as both consensus- and conflict-oriented party systems. Given these differences, our study represents a most-different-system design.³

The long time-period covered means that year-by-year data is not feasible. Instead, the aim has been to collect all types of data as close as possible to the middle of each decade, i.e. 1975, 1985, 1995, 2005 and 2015. We have focused on government declaration after the election closest prior to the mid-point of each decade.

¹ Decreased Ideological Polarization and Conflict in Western Europe (DIPAC) is funded by the Swedish Research Council (grant id: 2014-01246) and the Crafoord Foundation (grant id: 20150635; 20160645). For more information see <https://lnu.se/en/dipac>

² Until German reunification we study the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany/the Bonn Republic). After reunification we study the entire country.

³ Given that the focus is on European countries that have been stable democracies, there are a few other possible countries that we could have opted to study, for example Austria, Finland, and Italy. These would not have added any substantial variation in terms of the political or party system criteria we have used. We thus prioritized covering a longer time period rather than adding more countries.

This report covers the data collected by coding government declaration from the cases during our selected years, except Ireland. As Ireland does not have a tradition of giving government declaration, they are not included in this study. For all other cases, we collected the government declarations. The format and style of these may vary, but the government declarations are usually made at the start of the parliamentary year or immediately after the formation of governments, outlining the plans and policies of the new government. While the main focus is on ideological position of government declarations we have also coded if the government declarations emphasize competence over ideology and their main enemy and problem.

Ideology in government declarations

The DIPAC project analyses government declarations as ideological documents from government parties. We regard ideology as visions, frames or worldviews that give voters an idea of how the party would like to see society develop and why. So, how do we establish whether parties stand for different ideologies or worldviews? While occasionally parties end up supporting the same concrete policy, they could do this for completely different reasons. A populist radical right party might propose reduced levels of immigration because the party is ideologically in favour of an ‘ethnically homogeneous’ society. At the same time, a social democratic party might be supporting similar levels of immigration because the party is eager to preserve its ideologically prioritised welfare state (Hinnfors et al. 2012: 599).

In order to tap into the parties’ ideological reasoning, we believe it necessary to discern between levels of ‘increasing specificity and orientation towards action’ (Petersson 1964: 29). While pledges and issue positions are decidedly policy and action-oriented (Petersson 1964: 30; c.f. Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 8 ff.; Lewin 1967: 77; Rose 1993: 145 ff; for an overview, see Hinnfors 2006: 32 ff.) they do not provide us with first-hand information of a party’s ideological vision, undiluted by strategic or other reasons. Our focus is the ideological frame that the policies and pledges are set in rather than the pledges and policies as such (Åsard and Bennett 1997: 16; Hinnfors 2006: 37). These ideological frames are ‘ordering the world, ideas may shape agendas, which can profoundly shape outcomes. Insofar as ideas put blinders on people, reducing the number of conceivable alternatives, they serve as invisible switchmen, not only by turning action onto certain tracks rather than others ... but also by obscuring the other tracks from the agent’s view.’ (Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 12). Potentially political actors position themselves ‘along dimensions of ideology or values’ which might ‘shape voters’ political choices’ (Evans and De Graaf 2013: 5).

Coding of ideology

In order to determine the government parties' ideological positions, we have coded the government declarations after the general election during selected years. The focus is on the government declaration as a whole, not sentences or sections. The coding is thus qualitative, with the coder making a judgment for predetermined ideological sub-dimension. This also means that not every sentence is coded. Rather, the coder has identified typical quotes illustrating the government parties' reasoning on this dimension – along with any 'problematic' statements that might make the government parties' position unclear.

We code the government parties' ideologies into two dimensions, each with several predetermined sub-dimensions.⁴ These are listed in Table 1.

Table 1. Ideological dimensions and sub-dimensions in government declarations.

Left-Right	GAL-TAN
State-Market	Civil liberties – Law & order
Public-Private welfare provision	Cosmopolitanism - Nationalism
High – Low redistribution	Environment – Economic growth
	Individual liberty – Social authoritarianism
	Multiculturalism – National unity
	EU positive – EU negative

The focus on coding is always on the ideological reasoning of the government parties, in that there are no policy proposals that automatically place the government parties in a particular category on a particular dimension. Parties belonging to two separate governments may propose the same reform, but for different reasons. In one government declaration, parties might advocate state run train companies because it believes the state should command as much of the economy as possible, while in another government declarations, parties might be fiercely pro-market, but be willing to make an exception for publicly owned train companies due to managerial reasons. In the first case, the parties' belief in state ownership would lead it to be coded as Left on the sub-dimension State-Market. In the second case, the stated belief that the state should intervene in some cases, while the preference is for the free market would lead to a coding of Right with elements of Left.

⁴ The same sub-dimensions are used in our coding of election manifestos (see Blombäck et al. 2022).

The specific policy issues within each sub-dimension also tends to vary both between countries and over time. For this reason, we based the coding on a series of questions designed to tap into the ideological reasoning of the parties.⁵

State-market focuses on the state's role in economy. Should it regulate free market, and if so how much? Is it up to the state to solve (economic) problems, by regulation or stimulus packages, or is it better left to the market? Are government owned companies or utilities acceptable, or perhaps even desirable?

Public-private welfare provision focuses on who should provide welfare and other public goods. Do the government parties prefer private or public provision of, eg, health care and education? Is it the responsibility of the state or the individual/family to pay?

High – low redistribution asks how much redistribution there should be between rich and poor, as well as on issues of social spending and taxation.

Civil liberties - law and order focuses on the tension between the individual's rights against intervention from the state and the states mandate to ensure collective safety. Do the government parties prioritize rule of law and civil liberties or security? Is crime best dealt with by prevention or a focus on law enforcement? How much government surveillance is acceptable?

Cosmopolitanism – Nationalism focuses on the country's relationship to the surrounding world. Do the government parties view contact and collaboration with other countries as beneficial or threatening? Is national sovereignty or international co-operation most important? Is national security and well-being best ensured by diplomacy and free trade or a strong military?

Environment - economic growth does not only ask if the party believes that protecting the environment is good, but also how the party prioritizes between the environment and the economy. Is environmental protection only possible or desirable as long as it does not damage the economy and the standard of living, or should we be willing to make financial sacrifices in order to safeguard nature?

Individual liberty – social authoritarianism focuses on the relationship between the individual and the societal collective. Do the government parties stress the individual's right to choose how to live their life or the importance of traditional values and social cohesion? Should the government's role be to protect minorities, promote traditional ways of live or simply to not interfere in issues of family formation, religion etc?

⁵ The full coding scheme can be found in Appendix I.

Multiculturalism – national unity deals with the relationship between the state/nation and minority groups. Should it be possible or even encouraged for individuals and groups to use different languages and have different beliefs, or are all such differences a threat to the national unity? Should minority groups be allowed to make some decisions for themselves, or is it more important that all citizens are treated exactly the same?

EU positive – EU negative, finally, asks what the government parties' view on European integration are. Should the country remain in/join the EU and push for further integration, or should it leave/not join the EU?

The first step is determining if the sub-dimension is present at all in the government declaration, and coding how salient the sub-dimension is. Saliency is coded into 0-*No mention*, 1-*Mentioned*, 2-*Somewhat discussed* and 3-*Central dimension*. *No mention* simply means that the sub-dimension is not mentioned at all, while *Mentioned* means that the topic is addressed, but in such little detail that it is not possible to identify an ideological position.⁶ *Central dimensions* indicates the three sub-dimensions most important for the government parties, which were identified either by government declaration statements that a particular issue was most important or by several areas of politics being understood in the context of this sub-dimension.⁷ It is, however, possible for government parties to have fewer than three central sub-dimensions, if these criteria are not met for three sub-dimensions. All other sub-dimensions, where it is possible to identify a position, are coded as *Somewhat discussed*.

The sub-dimensions can then be aggregated to the level of the Left-Right and GAL-TAN dimensions respectively. This gives an average saliency between 0 and 3.

Since the identifying characteristics of the sub-dimensions that are least salient is that we do not know what the government parties think of them, either because they are not mentioned at all or only in passing, we cannot code an ideological position for them. Thus, only those sub-dimensions that are discussed or central (saliency 2 or 3) are coded into ideological positions.

For each sub-dimension the position is coded from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating Left or GAL. Each sub-dimension has five possible steps. In addition to *Left* and *Right* it is possible to be *Left, with elements of Right*, and vice versa, or in the central

⁶ Examples include government declarations stating that the environment is important or stating that their country is a member of the EU, but not making any proposals or indicating what kind of development they would like to see.

⁷ For example, by linking both economic and foreign policy to environmental issues, or by linking all social and economic problems with migration.

Both/Unclear category. In addition to *GAL* and *TAN* it is possible to be *GAL*, with elements of *TAN*, and vice versa, or in the central *Both/Unclear* category.

We have aggregated the sub-dimensions to the level of the Left-Right and GAL-TAN dimensions respectively, divided them with the available number of subdimensions. This gives an ideological position between 0 (Left/GAL) and 1 (Right/TAN).

The central *Both/Unclear* category actually captures two theoretically distinct concepts, both those government parties that are genuinely centrist and those government parties that are unclear. In order to be able to distinguish between these we have added the concept of *blurriness* to our coding. For government parties that have been coded in the centre we indicate if this is because the government declaration is actually ideologically centrist (not blurry) or if it is because the government declaration is combining positions from either side of the ideological dimension (blurry).

Ideology- competence, main problem and main enemy

We have coded each government declaration in terms of focus on an ideology or competence. If the government parties' appeal is mainly on its ideology or issue positions, we give it a score of 0, if it is mainly running on its governmental ability or previous success, we give it a score of 1, with two intermediate levels (0,25 – ideology with some competence and 0,75 – competence with some ideology).

For each government declaration, we also indicate the main problem and/or the main enemy.⁸ For some government parties the main problem and the main enemy will be the same, e.g., if the government parties indicate the opposition as the most important problem. For other government parties the main problem might be more abstract, such as 'the economy'. Not all government parties will always indicate a main enemy, making the presence or absence of an enemy an indicator of conflict between parties. Similarly, the main problem can be used as an alternative indication of which themes were salient for the government parties during their term in office.

The results from the coding are entered into a dataset. For the full set of variables, see Appendix II.

The coding process

The coding was carried out by a small team of coders recruited among MA students and recent MA graduates at the department of political science at the University of

⁸ We differentiate between government, opposition, other parties in parliament (e.g., far right parties) and non-parliamentary actors.

Gothenburg, supervised by Sofie Blombäck.⁹ All government declarations from the same party system were coded by the same coder, to ensure as much within country consistency as possible. At the same time, the coders worked close to each other, and were encouraged to discuss their coding so as to keep the whole project team ‘on the same page’.

Each coder was given instructions in the coding manual and the NVivo software used and briefed on the aim of the coding – that is to achieve a qualitative overall assessment of the government parties’ stance on each ideological sub-dimension. The coders read through each declaration, flagging sections of text that were relevant for identifying an ideological position on one or more sub-dimension. The coder then summarized each declaration into a coding sheet, indicating saliency, position and potential blurriness for each dimension, as well as the main enemy, main problem and focus on ideology or competence. For each of these coding decisions it was possible, but not mandatory, to enter a short comment motivating the coding decision. These coding sheets are aggregated into the dataset used in the DIPAC project, but all the coded declarations are also preserved so that they can be referred back to when carrying out analyses.¹⁰

Coders were also instructed to make special note of any coding decisions that were difficult to make for any reason, and all these were discussed at regular meetings between the coders and the project researchers to ensure that all borderline cases were handled in the same way.

Reliability analysis

While it should be kept in mind that a qualitative coding such as the one undertaken here can never be as precise as a more quantitative content analysis, we have carried out reliability coding for a part of the data. A new coder coded approximately 17 percent of the material. Krippendorff’s Alpha (De Swert, 2012), was calculated for the position for each of the sub-dimensions. Krippendorff’s Alpha (KALPHA) not only considers the observed, but also the expected, disagreement between two coders. The observed disagreement indicates the percentage of mismatches between coders in values attributed to the same units, whereas the expected disagreement is a probability measure that coders code a unit rightly just by chance. KALPHA is basically a measure of correlation, ranging from 0 to 1, between two variables (the same variable coded twice) weighed by the probability that correct coding is random. A score of 0.8 or above is usually seen as an indication of good inter coder

⁹ The three coders were Sofie Blombäck, Laura Lungu and Ruben Dielman. At the initial stages of the project Sara van der Meiden contributing to the development of the coding scheme.

¹⁰ For access to the full text of the government declarations with the DIPAC codes, contact the project manager (see <https://lnu.se/en/dipac>).

reliability, but scores as low as 0.6 can be acceptable if the coding is highly complex, as is the case here.

The result of the reliability coding is shown in Figures 1 through 2, indicating the scores both for treating the scale as ordinal and nominal values. Most indicators reach or surpass the 0.6 threshold, especially when it comes to the coding of the left-right variables. While the GAL-TAN variables show some more variation, it is worth noting that the aggregated ideological dimension has mean scores of just below 0.70, indicating that at the aggregated level we tend to have good inter coder reliability.

The ideology-competence variable was also recoded. It is not shown in the figures, but the KALPHA score was 0.84, regardless of whether the scale was considered to be nominal or ordinal.

Figure 1. Reliability test of Left-Right variables





Figure 2. Reliability test of GAL-TAN variables



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Lewin, L. (1967) *Planhushållningsdebatten*. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell.

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Appendix I – Coding schemes for Government Declarations

Saliency is coded for each sub-dimension in the following categories:

0	1	2	3
Not mentioned at all	Mentioned	Somewhat discussed, possible to identify position	Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided.

For each sub-dimension with a saliency score of 2 or 3, the party's position in the government declaration as a whole is coded into the following categories:

	0	0,25	0,5	0,75	1
Left-Right sub-dimensions	Left	Left, with elements of right	Both / Unclear	Right, with elements of left	Right
GAL-TAN sub-dimensions	GAL	GAL, with elements of TAN	Both / Unclear	TAN, with elements of GAL	TAN
Ideology-Competence	Focus on ideology	Ideology, with elements of competence	N.A	Competence, with elements of ideology	Focus on competence

Coding scheme for the ideological positions

	0	0,25	0,5	0,75	1
State-Market	State guides the economy to a large extent. State should own some/many commodities. Active intervention by state solution to economic problems. Exception: unions/employer association can be allowed, but should be regulated/protected to avoid bad effects of market on people.	State should be active in the economy, but there are also some areas where the free market makes necessary/important contributions.	Either unclear position, or combination of pro-free market with role for the state	The free market is preeminent, but there are some cases where the state might need to play a role. Regulation of market important. State can act to improve conditions (infrastructure, education) for business, as long as not interfering with free market.	As little involvement of state as possible, state only regulates free market. No/low state ownership, privatizations good. Deregulation as solution to economic problem. Exception: regulation acceptable if intended to free market from subversion by e.g. unions
Public-Private welfare provision	The state should both finance and provide welfare. Some private complements can be tolerated, but not encouraged Equal access important	Some (positive) role for private actors possible, e.g. voluntary organisations, but welfare is the responsibility of the state.	Either unclear position, or combination of both, e.g. freedom to choose provider with state guarantee of access	State can regulate, fund or provide welfare to some degree, but private options are preferred and encouraged.	Welfare should be provided and to at least some degree funded by private actors. Freedom to choose important
High- Low redistribution	Large degree of redistribution. High taxes, especially for wealthy, and large social spending, especially targeting the poor.	High taxes and large social spending, but with less focus on redistribution, e.g. non-income related taxes or general welfare programmes	Unclear position, or combining elements from both sides, e.g. favouring both tax cuts for wealthy and increased social spending on poor	Low taxes and low social spending, but with less focus on diminished redistribution, e.g. tax cuts to low income earners. Social spending should be focused on those who most need it.	Low share of redistribution. Lower taxes, especially for wealthy, and cuts to social spending, especially targeting poor.

Environment – Economic growth	The environment should be protected, (almost) no matter what the economic cost. Economic growth and environmental protection difficult to achieve at the same time.	The environment should be protected, in a cost-efficient way. Economic growth harms the environment, this should be rectified.	Unclear position, e.g. mentioning environment as important but not connecting with economy. Arguing that environmental protection and economic growth go together	Environmental concerns can only be addressed when the cost is not too high.	Economic growth should (nearly always) be prioritized over environmental concerns.
Civil liberties – Law & order	Protection of civil liberties and individual rights paramount. Focus on e.g. right to fair trial If state must intervene prevention & care preferable to punishment.	Civil liberties are most important, but some reference to maintaining law and order is also made. If state must intervene prevention & care preferable to punishment.	Unclear, or elements of both. E.g. protection of some civil liberties combined with harsher sentences for some crimes	While the state/society has the right to protect itself, some efforts should be made to protect the individual's rights. Prevention, not only punishment	Protection of law and order paramount. Focus on punishment, little or no focus on prevention of crime.
Individual liberty– Social authoritarianism	The individuals right to live as (s)he wishes is paramount. State should not prohibit some lifestyles (e.g. freedom of religion) or promoting others (e.g. benefits targeting traditional families). Exception: if explicit goal to promote individual freedom in society, e.g. regulation making it possible for individual to free themselves from social restrictions	The individual should be free to choose lifestyle, but some limitations might be necessary to ensure a functional society. State can interfere to promote individual freedom or equal chances in society.	Unclear, or elements of both, e.g. social norms held to be most important in some areas but individual freedom in others	Individual lifestyle choices should be allowed, but not encouraged, and only if these do not pose threat to collective. No special treatment	The collective (family, nation, class, survival of human race etc.) is more important than the individual. State should promote traditional values and ways of life in order to protect social cohesion.

Multiculturalism – National unity	Several cultures/ways of life can co-exist & is beneficial. Migration policies should be generous, and the rights of minority groups protected. Migration & other cultural differences as opportunity, not threat. State/majority group responsible for integration	While multiculturalism is good and should be encouraged, it's important not to lose all traditional identity. Migration is in general positive, but some limitations/controls/demands might be needed. Minority group responsible for integration.	Unclear, or elements of both. E.g. protection for national minorities but not migrants, or openness to migration only if beneficial to own country.	Minority cultures can be tolerated, but only if secondary to national identity. State should not support or encourage any other traditions than the national ones. If migration is unavoidable it should be highly regulated	Different cultures can and should not be mixed. Traditional way of life should be defended. Migration policies should be strict, with repatriation or assimilation as the goal. Migration & other cultural differences as threat, not opportunity.
Cosmopolitanism – Nationalism	Contributing to a better world paramount. Co-operation with others is important, even if this entails loss of sovereignty. Unilateral force should not be used in international relations, no military alliances. Globalisation as opportunity, not threat. Any problems associated with globalisation should be solved by international co-operation	International co-operation is important and should be peaceful – but alliances for security, peace keeping missions etc. acceptable. Loss of sovereignty only acceptable if clearly outweighed by benefits.	Unclear, or elements of both.	International co-operation can be beneficial, but important that own country gains (financial, security, power etc.) from it. Loss of sovereignty not acceptable. Strong defence important	Protection of own country paramount. Co-operation with others is risky and only acceptable if clearly advantageous. Loss of sovereignty never acceptable. Strong military important. Globalisation as threat. Solution to problems of globalisation is isolation/ protectionism

Pro-EU – Anti-EU	EU good thing, integration should be pushed further. Problems with EU should be solved by further co-operation/integration. More EU-members good thing	EU good thing, but further integration should be done carefully. Principle of subsidiarity important. Positive to current EU, but no mention of more or less integration.	EU not perfect/has problems or is “bad idea”, but should not leave. EU good idea, but should not join.	EU bad thing, less integration or substantial reform desirable. Either reform or leave.	EU bad thing, European integration not desirable. Leave/not join
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Appendix II – Variables

Code	Variable
General information	
ID	1-12, 14-109
Party_id	28 Venstresocialisterne (VS), Enhedslisten – De Rød-Grønne (Ø)
	29 Danmarks Kommunistiske Parti (DKP)
	30 Socialistisk Folkeparti (F)
	31 Socialdemokraterne (A)
	32 Centrumdemokraterne (M)
	33 Det Radikale Venstre (B)
	34 Retsforbundet (E)
	35 Det Konservative Folkeparti (C)
	36 Kristeligt folkeparti, Kristendemokraterne (K)
	37 Venstre, Danmarks Liberale Parti (B)
	38 Fremskridtspartiet (Z)
	39 De Grønne (MDG)
	41 Dansk Folkeparti (O)
	42 Ny/Liberal Alliance
	43 Nye Borgerlige (D)
	44 Alternativet (Å)
	45 Extre-gauche (PSU)
	46 Parti Communiste Français (PCF)
	47 La France Insoumise
	48 Parti Socialiste (PS)
	49 Mouvement des Radiaux de Gauche (MRG)
	50 Centre démocratie et progrès, Centre des Démocrates Sociaux (SDS)
	51 Nouveau Centre (C), Les Centristes (LC), Union of Democrats and Independents (UDI)
	52 Parti Radical
	53 Ecologists (Mouvement Ecologique) 1999- Les Vertes, Europe Écologie Les Verts (ELVV)
	54 Autres Ecologists
	55 Rassemblement pour la République (RPR), Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP), Les Républicains (LR)
	56 Parti Republicain
	57 Agir, la droite constructive (ACT)
	58 Mouvement Réformateur
	59 Union pour la Démocratie Française (UDF), Mouvement Démocrate (MoDem)
	60 Centre National des Indépendants et Paysans
	61 Front National (2005: FN+sorted extreme right)
	62 Démocratie Libérale
	63 Chasse, pêche, nature et traditions (CPNT)
	64 Mouvement pour la France (MPF)
	65 Alliance Centriste

	66	Debout la République (DLR), Debout la France (DLF)
	67	La République En Marche! (LaREM)
	68	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD)
	69	Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP)
	70	Die Grünen/Buendnis 90
	71	Christlich-Demokratische Union/Christlich-Soziale Union (CDU/CSU)
	72	Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (PDS), Die Linke
	73	Alternative für Deutschland (AfD)
	74	Labour Party
	75	Fine Gael (Irish Family)
	76	Fianna Fail (Soldiers of Destiny)
	77	Sinn Fein (Ourselves alone)
	78	Progressive Democrats
	79	Green Party
	80	Workers Party
	81	Socialist Party
	82	Democratic left
	83	People Before Profit Alliance
	90	Communistische Partij Nederland (CPN)
	91	Pacifistisch Socialistische Partij (PSP)
	92	Politieke Partij Radikalen (PPR)
	93	Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA)
	94	Democraten '66 (D'66)
	95	Democratisch Socialisten '70 (DS'70)
	96	Christen-Democratisch Appèl (CDA)
	97	Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD)
	98	Boerenpartij (BP)
	99	Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij (SGP)
	100	Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond (GPV), ChristenUnie (CU) (GPV+RPF after 2000)
	101	List Pim Fortuyn
	102	Reformatische Politieke Federatie (RPF)
	103	Katholieke Volkspartij
	104	GroenLinks
	105	Socialistische Partij
	106	Christelijk-Historische Unie
	107	Centrumsdemocraten
	108	De Groenen
	109	Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV)
	110	Partij voor de Dieren (PvdD)
	111	Anti-Revolutionaire Partij
	112	50Plus
	113	Algemeen Ouderen Verbond
	114	Forum voor Democratie (FvD)
	115	Det norske Arbeiderparti (DNA), Arbeiderpartiet (Ap)
	116	Det Nye/Liberale Folkepartiet (DNF/DLF)

	117	Høyre (H)
	118	Kristeligt Folkeparti (KrF)
	119	Pensjonistpartiet
	120	Rød Valgallianse (RV), Rødt
	121	Senterpartiet (SP)
	122	Socialtisk Valgforbund/ Socialistik Venstre (SV)
	123	Venstre
	124	Anders Langes Parti/Framskrittspartiet (FrP)
	125	Miljøpartiet De Grønne (MDG)
	126	Kystpartiet
	127	Vänsterpartiet kommunisterna (VPK), Vänsterpartiet (V)
	128	Socialdemokratiska arbetarepartiet, Socialdemokraterna (S)
	129	Centerpartiet (C)
	130	Folkpartiet, Folkpartiet liberalerna (FP), Liberalerna (L)
	131	Moderata samlingspartiet, Moderaterna (M)
	132	Kristen demokratisk samling, Kristdemokratiske samhällspartiet (KDS), Kristdemokraterna (KD)
	133	Miljöpartiet, Miljöpartiet de gröna (MP)
	134	Ny demokrati (NYD)
	135	Sverigedemokraterna (SD)
	136	Labour Party
	137	Liberal Party, Social Democratic Party, LP/SDP Alliance, Liberal Democrats (LD)
	138	SNP (also if "Nationalists" (Scottish, Welsh))
	139	Conservative Party
	140	Green Party
	141	Plaid Cumry
	142	UK Independence Party (UKIP)
Party_name	Party Name	
Countryname	Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom	
Country_id	1 Denmark, 2 France, 3 Germany, 4 Ireland, 5 Netherlands, 6 Norway, 7 Sweden, 8 United Kingdom	
Year.1970	Election year coded in the mid-1970s (year of election): 1972-1975	
Year.1980	Election year coded in the mid-1980s (year of election): 1981-1985	
Year.1990	Election year coded in the mid-1990s (year of election): 1992-1994	
Year.2000	Election year coded in the mid-2000s (year of election): 2002-2005	
Year.2010	Election year coded in the mid-2010s (year of election): 2011-2015	
End_term.1970	End of electoral term, year: 1976-1979	
End_term.1980	End of electoral term, year: 1986-1989	
End_term.1990	End of electoral term, year: 1997-1998	
End_term.2000	End of electoral term, year: 2006-2010	
End_term.2010	End of electoral term, year: 2016-2019	
government.1970	Last name of prime minister and number of the government when appropriate	
government.1980	Last name of prime minister and number of the government when appropriate	

government.1990	Last name of prime minister and number of the government when appropriate
government.2000	Last name of prime minister and number of the government when appropriate
government.2010	Last name of prime minister and number of the government when appropriate
Ideological variables	
SM_s.1970	State-Market saliency in the mid-1970s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3)
SM_s.1980	State-Market saliency in the mid-1980s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3)
SM_s.1990	State-Market saliency in the mid-1990s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3)
SM_s.2000	State-Market saliency in the mid-2000s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3)
SM_s.2010	State-Market saliency in the mid-2010s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3)
SM_p.1970	State-Market position in the mid-1970s: state (0), market (1)
SM_p.1980	State-Market position in the mid-1980s: state (0), market (1)
SM_p.1990	State-Market position in the mid-1990s: state (0), market (1)
SM_p.2000	State-Market position in the mid-2000s: state (0), market (1)
SM_p.2010	State-Market position in the mid-2010s: state (0), market (1)
SM_b.1970	State-Market blurriness in the mid-1970s: low (0), high (1)
SM_b.1980	State-Market blurriness in the mid-1980s: low (0), high (1)
SM_b.1990	State-Market blurriness in the mid-1990s: low (0), high (1)
SM_b.2000	State-Market blurriness in the mid-2000s: low (0), high (1)
SM_b.2010	State-Market blurriness in the mid-2010s: low (0), high (1)
PP_s.1970	Public-Private welfare provision saliency in the mid-1970s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3)
PP_s.1980	Public-Private welfare provision saliency in the mid-1980s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3)
PP_s.1990	Public-Private welfare provision saliency in the mid-1990s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3)
PP_s.2000	Public-Private welfare provision saliency in the mid-2000s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3)
PP_s.2010	Public-Private welfare provision saliency in the mid-2010s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3)

PP_p.1970	Public-Private welfare provision position in the mid-1970s: public (0), private (1)
PP_p.1980	Public-Private welfare provision position in the mid-1980s: public (0), private (1)
PP_p.1990	Public-Private welfare provision position in the mid-1990s: public (0), private (1)
PP_p.2000	Public-Private welfare provision position in the mid-2000s: public (0), private (1)
PP_p.2010	Public-Private welfare provision position in the mid-2010s: public (0), private (1)
PP_b.1970	Public-Private welfare provision blurriness in the mid-1970s: low (0), high (1)
PP_b.1980	Public-Private welfare provision blurriness in the mid-1980s: low (0), high (1)
PP_b.1990	Public-Private welfare provision blurriness in the mid-1990s: low (0), high (1)
PP_b.2000	Public-Private welfare provision blurriness in the mid-2000s: low (0), high (1)
PP_b.2010	Public-Private welfare provision blurriness in the mid-2010s: low (0), high (1)
RE_s.1970	High-Low redistribution saliency in the mid-1970s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3)
RE_s.1980	High-Low redistribution saliency in the mid-1980s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3)
RE_s.1990	High-Low redistribution saliency in the mid-1990s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3)
RE_s.2000	High-Low redistribution saliency in the mid-2000s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3)
RE_s.2010	High-Low redistribution saliency in the mid-2010s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3)
RE_p.1970	High-Low redistribution position in the mid-1970s: high (1), low (1)
RE_p.1980	High-Low redistribution position in the mid-1980s: high (1), low (1)
RE_p.1990	High-Low redistribution position in the mid-1990s: high (1), low (1)
RE_p.2000	High-Low redistribution position in the mid-2000s: high (1), low (1)
RE_p.2010	High-Low redistribution position in the mid-2010s: high (1), low (1)
RE_b.1970	High-Low redistribution blurriness in the mid-1970s: low (0), high (1)
RE_b.1980	High-Low redistribution blurriness in the mid-1980s: low (0), high (1)
RE_b.1990	High-Low redistribution blurriness in the mid-1990s: low (0), high (1)
RE_b.2000	High-Low redistribution blurriness in the mid-2000s: low (0), high (1)
RE_b.2010	High-Low redistribution blurriness in the mid-2010s: low (0), high (1)
LR_s.1970	Average Left-Right saliency in the mid-1970s (SM_s.1970+PP_s.1970+RE_s.1970 /3): low saliency (0), high saliency (3)

LR_s.1980	Average Left-Right saliency in the mid-1980s (SM_s.1980+PP_s.1980+RE_s.1980 /3): low saliency (0), high saliency (3)
LR_s.1990	Average Left-Right saliency in the mid-1990s (SM_s.1990+PP_s.1990+RE_s.1990 /3): low saliency (0), high saliency (3)
LR_s.2000	Average Left-Right saliency in the mid-2000s (SM_s.2000+PP_s.2000+RE_s.2000 /3): low saliency (0), high saliency (3)
LR_s.2010	Average Left-Right saliency in the mid-2010s (SM_s.2010+PP_s.2010+RE_s.2010 /3): low saliency (0), high saliency (3)
LR_p.1970	Average Left-Right position in the mid-1970s (SM_p.1970+PP_p.1970+RE_9.1970 /3): left (0), right (1)
LR_p.1980	Average Left-Right position in the mid-1980s (SM_p.1980+PP_p.1980+RE_9.1980 /3): left (0), right (1)
LR_p.1990	Average Left-Right position in the mid-1990s (SM_p.1990+PP_p.1990+RE_9.1990 /3): left (0), right (1)
LR_p.2000	Average Left-Right position in the mid-2000s (SM_p.2000+PP_p.2000+RE_9.2000 /3): left (0), right (1)
LR_p.2010	Average Left-Right position in the mid-2010s (SM_p.2010+PP_p.2010+RE_9.2010 /3): left (0), right (1)
LR_b.1970	Average Left-Right blurriness in the mid-1970s (SM_b.1970+PP_b.1970+RE_b.1970 /3): low (0), high (1)
LR_b.1980	Average Left-Right blurriness in the mid-1980s (SM_b.1980+PP_b.1980+RE_b.1980 /3): low (0), high (1)
LR_b.1990	Average Left-Right blurriness in the mid-1990s (SM_b.1990+PP_b.1990+RE_b.1990 /3): low (0), high (1)
LR_b.2000	Average Left-Right blurriness in the mid-2000s (SM_b.2000+PP_b.2000+RE_b.2000 /3): low (0), high (1)
LR_b.2010	Average Left-Right blurriness in the mid-2010s (SM_b.2010+PP_b.2010+RE_b.2010 /3): low (0), high (1)
CL_s.1970	Civil liberties –Law and order saliency in the mid-1970s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3)
CL_s.1980	Civil liberties –Law and order saliency in the mid-1980s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3)
CL_s.1990	Civil liberties –Law and order saliency in the mid-1990s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3)
CL_s.2000	Civil liberties –Law and order saliency in the mid-2000s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3)
CL_s.2010	Civil liberties –Law and order saliency in the mid-2010s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3)

CL_p.1970	Civil liberties –Law and order position in the mid-1970s: Civil liberties (0), Law and order (1)
CL_p.1980	Civil liberties –Law and order position in the mid-1980s: Civil liberties (0), Law and order (1)
CL_p.1990	Civil liberties –Law and order position in the mid-1990s: Civil liberties (0), Law and order (1)
CL_p.2000	Civil liberties –Law and order position in the mid-2000s: Civil liberties (0), Law and order (1)
CL_p.2010	Civil liberties –Law and order position in the mid-2010s: Civil liberties (0), Law and order (1)
CL_b.1970	Civil liberties –Law and order blurriness in the mid-1970s: low (0), high (1)
CL_b.1980	Civil liberties –Law and order blurriness in the mid-1980s: low (0), high (1)
CL_b.1990	Civil liberties –Law and order blurriness in the mid-1990s: low (0), high (1)
CL_b.2000	Civil liberties –Law and order blurriness in the mid-2000s: low (0), high (1)
CL_b.2010	Civil liberties –Law and order blurriness in the mid-2010s: low (0), high (1)
CN_s.1970	Cosmopolitanism – Nationalism saliency in the mid-1970s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3)
CN_s.1980	Cosmopolitanism – Nationalism saliency in the mid-1980s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3)
CN_s.1990	Cosmopolitanism – Nationalism saliency in the mid-1990s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3)
CN_s.2000	Cosmopolitanism – Nationalism saliency in the mid-2000s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3)
CN_s.2010	Cosmopolitanism – Nationalism saliency in the mid-2010s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3)
CN_p.1970	Cosmopolitanism – Nationalism position in the mid-1970s: cosmopolitanism (0), nationalism (1)
CN_p.1980	Cosmopolitanism – Nationalism position in the mid-1980s: cosmopolitanism (0), nationalism (1)
CN_p.1990	Cosmopolitanism – Nationalism position in the mid-1990s: cosmopolitanism (0), nationalism (1)
CN_p.2000	Cosmopolitanism – Nationalism position in the mid-2000s: cosmopolitanism (0), nationalism (1)
CN_p.2010	Cosmopolitanism – Nationalism position in the mid-2010s: cosmopolitanism (0), nationalism (1)
CN_b.1970	Cosmopolitanism – Nationalism blurriness in the mid-1970s: low (0), high (1)

CN_b.1980	Cosmopolitanism – Nationalism blurriness in the mid-1980s: low (0), high (1)
CN_b.1990	Cosmopolitanism – Nationalism blurriness in the mid-1990s: low (0), high (1)
CN_b.2000	Cosmopolitanism – Nationalism blurriness in the mid-2000s: low (0), high (1)
CN_b.2010	Cosmopolitanism – Nationalism blurriness in the mid-2010s: low (0), high (1)
EE_s.1970	Environment – Economic growth saliency in the mid-1970s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3)
EE_s.1980	Environment – Economic growth saliency in the mid-1980s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3)
EE_s.1990	Environment – Economic growth saliency in the mid-1990s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3)
EE_s.2000	Environment – Economic growth saliency in the mid-2000s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3)
EE_s.2010	Environment – Economic growth saliency in the mid-2010s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3)
EE_p.1970	Environment – Economic growth position in the mid-1970s: environment (0), economic growth (1)
EE_p.1980	Environment – Economic growth position in the mid-1980s: environment (0), economic growth (1)
EE_p.1990	Environment – Economic growth position in the mid-1990s: environment (0), economic growth (1)
EE_p.2000	Environment – Economic growth position in the mid-2000s: environment (0), economic growth (1)
EE_p.2010	Environment – Economic growth position in the mid-2010s: environment (0), economic growth (1)
EE_b.1970	Environment – Economic growth blurriness in the mid-1970s: low (0), high (1)
EE_b.1980	Environment – Economic growth blurriness in the mid-1980s: low (0), high (1)
EE_b.1990	Environment – Economic growth blurriness in the mid-1990s: low (0), high (1)
EE_b.2000	Environment – Economic growth blurriness in the mid-2000s: low (0), high (1)
EE_b.2010	Environment – Economic growth blurriness in the mid-2010s: low (0), high (1)
IS_s.1970	Individual liberty – Social authoritarianism saliency in the mid-1970s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3)

IS_s.1980	Individual liberty – Social authoritarianism saliency in the mid-1980s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3)
IS_s.1990	Individual liberty – Social authoritarianism saliency in the mid-1990s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3)
IS_s.2000	Individual liberty – Social authoritarianism saliency in the mid-2000s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3)
IS_s.2010	Individual liberty – Social authoritarianism saliency in the mid-2010s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3)
IS_p.1970	Individual liberty – Social authoritarianism position in the mid-1970s: individual liberty (0), Social authoritarianism (1)
IS_p.1980	Individual liberty – Social authoritarianism position in the mid-1980s: individual liberty (0), Social authoritarianism (1)
IS_p.1990	Individual liberty – Social authoritarianism position in the mid-1990s: individual liberty (0), Social authoritarianism (1)
IS_p.2000	Individual liberty – Social authoritarianism position in the mid-2000s: individual liberty (0), Social authoritarianism (1)
IS_p.2010	Individual liberty – Social authoritarianism position in the mid-2010s: individual liberty (0), Social authoritarianism (1)
IS_b.1970	Individual liberty – Social authoritarianism blurriness in the mid-1970s: low (0), high (1)
IS_b.1980	Individual liberty – Social authoritarianism blurriness in the mid-1980s: low (0), high (1)
IS_b.1990	Individual liberty – Social authoritarianism blurriness in the mid-1990s: low (0), high (1)
IS_b.2000	Individual liberty – Social authoritarianism blurriness in the mid-2000s: low (0), high (1)
IS_b.2010	Individual liberty – Social authoritarianism blurriness in the mid-2010s: low (0), high (1)
MN_s.1970	Multiculturalism – National unity saliency in the mid-1970s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3)
MN_s.1980	Multiculturalism – National unity saliency in the mid-1980s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3)
MN_s.1990	Multiculturalism – National unity saliency in the mid-1990s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3)
MN_s.2000	Multiculturalism – National unity saliency in the mid-2000s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3)
MN_s.2010	Multiculturalism – National unity saliency in the mid-2010s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3)

MN_p.1970	Multiculturalism – National unity position in the mid-1970s: multiculturalism (0), National unity (1)
MN_p.1980	Multiculturalism – National unity position in the mid-1980s: multiculturalism (0), National unity (1)
MN_p.1990	Multiculturalism – National unity position in the mid-1990s: multiculturalism (0), National unity (1)
MN_p.2000	Multiculturalism – National unity position in the mid-2000s: multiculturalism (0), National unity (1)
MN_p.2010	Multiculturalism – National unity position in the mid-2010s: multiculturalism (0), National unity (1)
MN_b.1970	Multiculturalism – National unity blurriness in the mid-1970s: low (0), high (1)
MN_b.1980	Multiculturalism – National unity blurriness in the mid-1980s: low (0), high (1)
MN_b.1990	Multiculturalism – National unity blurriness in the mid-1990s: low (0), high (1)
MN_b.2000	Multiculturalism – National unity blurriness in the mid-2000s: low (0), high (1)
MN_b.2010	Multiculturalism – National unity blurriness in the mid-2010s: low (0), high (1)
EU_s.1970	Pro-Anti EU saliency in the mid-1970s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3)
EU_s.1980	Pro-Anti EU saliency in the mid-1980s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3)
EU_s.1990	Pro-Anti EU saliency in the mid-1990s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3)
EU_s.2000	Pro-Anti EU saliency in the mid-2000s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3)
EU_s.2010	Pro-Anti EU saliency in the mid-2010s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3)
EU_p.1970	Pro-Anti EU position in the mid-1970s: pro-EU (0), anti-EU (1)
EU_p.1980	Pro-Anti EU position in the mid-1980s: pro-EU (0), anti-EU (1)
EU_p.1990	Pro-Anti EU position in the mid-1990s: pro-EU (0), anti-EU (1)
EU_p.2000	Pro-Anti EU position in the mid-2000s: pro-EU (0), anti-EU (1)
EU_p.2010	Pro-Anti EU position in the mid-2010s: pro-EU (0), anti-EU (1)
EU_b.1970	Pro-Anti EU blurriness in the mid-1970s: low (0), high (1)
EU_b.1980	Pro-Anti EU blurriness in the mid-1980s: low (0), high (1)
EU_b.1990	Pro-Anti EU blurriness in the mid-1990s: low (0), high (1)
EU_b.2000	Pro-Anti EU blurriness in the mid-2000s: low (0), high (1)
EU_b.2010	Pro-Anti EU blurriness in the mid-2010s: low (0), high (1)
GT_s.1970	Average GAL-TAN saliency in the mid-1970s (CL_s.1970+CN_s.1970+EE_s.1970+IS_s.1970+MN_s.1970+EU_s.1970/6): Low saliency (0), High saliency (3)

GT_s.1980	Average GAL-TAN saliency in the mid-1980s (CL_s.1980+CN_s.1980+EE_s.1980+IS_s.1980+MN_s.1980+EU_s.1980/6): Low saliency (0), High saliency (3)
GT_s.1990	Average GAL-TAN saliency in the mid-1990s (CL_s.1990+CN_s.1990+EE_s.1990+IS_s.1990+MN_s.1990+EU_s.1990/6): Low saliency (0), High saliency (3)
GT_s.2000	Average GAL-TAN saliency in the mid-2000s (CL_s.2000+CN_s.2000+EE_s.2000+IS_s.2000+MN_s.2000+EU_s.2000/6): Low saliency (0), High saliency (3)
GT_s.2010	Average GAL-TAN saliency in the mid-2010s (CL_s.2010+CN_s.2010+EE_s.2010+IS_s.2010+MN_s.2010+EU_s.2010/6): Low saliency (0), High saliency (3)
GT_p.1970	Average GAL-TAN position in the mid-1970s (CL_p.1970+CN_p.1970+EE_p.1970+IS_p.1970+MN_p.1970+EU_p.1970/6): GAL (0), TAN (1)
GT_p.1980	Average GAL-TAN position in the mid-1980s (CL_p.1980+CN_p.1980+EE_p.1980+IS_p.1980+MN_p.1980+EU_p.1980/6): GAL (0), TAN (1)
GT_p.1990	Average GAL-TAN position in the mid-1990s (CL_p.1990+CN_p.1990+EE_p.1990+IS_p.1990+MN_p.1990+EU_p.1990/6): GAL (0), TAN (1)
GT_p.2000	Average GAL-TAN position in the mid-2000s (CL_p.2000+CN_p.2000+EE_p.2000+IS_p.2000+MN_p.2000+EU_p.2000/6): GAL (0), TAN (1)
GT_p.2010	Average GAL-TAN position in the mid-2010s (CL_p.2010+CN_p.2010+EE_p.2010+IS_p.2010+MN_p.2010+EU_p.2010/6): GAL (0), TAN (1)
GT_b.1970	Average GAL-TAN blurriness in the mid-1970s (CL_b.1970+CN_b.1970+EE_b.1970+IS_b.1970+MN_b.1970+EU_b.1970/6): low (0), high (1)
GT_b.1980	Average GAL-TAN blurriness in the mid-1980s (CL_b.1980+CN_b.1980+EE_b.1980+IS_b.1980+MN_b.1980+EU_b.1980/6): low (0), high (1)
GT_b.1990	Average GAL-TAN blurriness in the mid-1990s (CL_b.1990+CN_b.1990+EE_b.1990+IS_b.1990+MN_b.1990+EU_b.1990/6): low (0), high (1)
GT_b.2000	Average GAL-TAN blurriness in the mid-2000s (CL_b.2000+CN_b.2000+EE_b.2000+IS_b.2000+MN_b.2000+EU_b.2000/6): low (0), high (1)
GT_b.2010	Average GAL-TAN blurriness in the mid-2010s (CL_b.2010+CN_b.2010+EE_b.2010+IS_b.2010+MN_b.2010+EU_b.2010/6): low (0), high (1)
IC.1970	Ideology – Competence in the mid-1970s: Mainly ideology (0), ideology with some competence (0.75), competence with some ideology (0.25), Mainly competence (1)
IC.1980	Ideology – Competence in the mid-1980s: Mainly ideology (0), ideology with some competence (0.75), competence with some ideology (0.25), Mainly competence (1)

IC.1990	Ideology – Competence in the mid-1990s: Mainly ideology (0), ideology with some competence (0.75), competence with some ideology (0.25), Mainly competence (1)
IC.2000	Ideology – Competence in the mid-2000s: Mainly ideology (0), ideology with some competence (0.75), competence with some ideology (0.25), Mainly competence (1)
IC.2010	Ideology – Competence in the mid-2010s: Mainly ideology (0), ideology with some competence (0.75), competence with some ideology (0.25), Mainly competence (1)